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The Arcturus Strain Of Covid Is Said To Be Already
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Responsible for 5 deaths in the UK.
If it became widespread would the government look to another lockdown?
If it became widespread would the government look to another lockdown?
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//I honestly do not believe that the public could face or obey another lockdown.//
The problem is, retro, that the main causes of the problems the country is now facing because of earlier lockdowns (e.g. huge government debt, enormous NHS waiting lists, prolonged mental and physical health problems) would have occurred whether people obeyed the lockdown or not. The main problem was not that they couldn't go out, but that all the places they might have wanted to go were forcibly closed.
Though nothing would surprise me, I cannot imagine that any government would embark on such tactics again. This country had a well planned strategy to deal with a pandemic; it had been developed over a number of years and was approved by the WHO (not that it needed their approval) and did not involve lockdowns. It was unceremoniously ditched as soon as the Twitterati got to work with their howls of "granny murderers" and the like. Lockdowns were said to be to "Save Lives and protect the NHS". Well I doubt they saved too many lives and as for the NHS - well I think it is the patients who need protecting from its inefficiencies.
The problem is, retro, that the main causes of the problems the country is now facing because of earlier lockdowns (e.g. huge government debt, enormous NHS waiting lists, prolonged mental and physical health problems) would have occurred whether people obeyed the lockdown or not. The main problem was not that they couldn't go out, but that all the places they might have wanted to go were forcibly closed.
Though nothing would surprise me, I cannot imagine that any government would embark on such tactics again. This country had a well planned strategy to deal with a pandemic; it had been developed over a number of years and was approved by the WHO (not that it needed their approval) and did not involve lockdowns. It was unceremoniously ditched as soon as the Twitterati got to work with their howls of "granny murderers" and the like. Lockdowns were said to be to "Save Lives and protect the NHS". Well I doubt they saved too many lives and as for the NHS - well I think it is the patients who need protecting from its inefficiencies.
An effective riot or so may have forceably opened them again. Not that anyone is advocating that, just considering likely outcomes.
Government seems intent on trying to start them what with all the ridiculous legislation they have been considering of late. Maybe it's intended to keep any such thing within a 15 minute radius and with zero emmissions, not to mention charging each rioter for using the road on a distance rioted basis.
Government seems intent on trying to start them what with all the ridiculous legislation they have been considering of late. Maybe it's intended to keep any such thing within a 15 minute radius and with zero emmissions, not to mention charging each rioter for using the road on a distance rioted basis.
// This country had a well planned strategy to deal with a pandemic; it had been developed over a number of years and was approved by the WHO (not that it needed their approval) and did not involve lockdowns. //
This is wrong: see, for example, https:/
It's precisely because the plan in place, which seems to have been based around a flu virus or a virus that had a lower reproduction rate, had already failed (especially in the critical period of January-March 2020, before the lockdown) that lockdowns were judged to be necessary. It's also simply wrong to insist that they were (a) working and (b) ditched "as soon as the Twitterati got to work"; whether or not lockdown was a mistake, what mattered was the scientific advice at the time.
As far as I can tell, there's emerging evidence that the effects of a lockdown were compared against, in a sense, the wrong thing, namely that the public wouldn't react at all. If so, this seems quite a serious oversight; human behaviour is complicated to model perfectly, and you can never entirely be sure about a counterfactual, but even still, if thousands are dying and if hospitals are getting clogged up, then it likely doesn't take a mandate to force *most* people to alter their behaviour, even a little.
https:/
This is wrong: see, for example, https:/
It's precisely because the plan in place, which seems to have been based around a flu virus or a virus that had a lower reproduction rate, had already failed (especially in the critical period of January-March 2020, before the lockdown) that lockdowns were judged to be necessary. It's also simply wrong to insist that they were (a) working and (b) ditched "as soon as the Twitterati got to work"; whether or not lockdown was a mistake, what mattered was the scientific advice at the time.
As far as I can tell, there's emerging evidence that the effects of a lockdown were compared against, in a sense, the wrong thing, namely that the public wouldn't react at all. If so, this seems quite a serious oversight; human behaviour is complicated to model perfectly, and you can never entirely be sure about a counterfactual, but even still, if thousands are dying and if hospitals are getting clogged up, then it likely doesn't take a mandate to force *most* people to alter their behaviour, even a little.
https:/
We'll have to agree to differ as to why the strategy changed. The government is hardly likely to suggest it reacted to hysteria.
Whilst I have only "speed read" it, the report from the first of your links (UK Pandemic Preparedness) was only published some nine months after the pandemic began in the UK so I cannot see how it helps to examine the decision making that went on in March 2020. It does not seem to mention national lockdowns but instead lists some
rather wooly concepts with little detail. The second of your links, incidentally, does not work.
//...then it likely doesn't take a mandate to force *most* people to alter their behaviour, even a little.//
No it doesn't and a few other countries trusted their populations to behave sensibly. The UK government did not and so imposed the most Draconian measures to curb civil liberties this country has ever seen. We will never know whether they were beneficial (in the long term) or not. The indications are that most of them probably were not and it simply isn't good enough to say the government faced an unprecedented problem. It had plenty of information to show how such a pandemic may pan out and how various measures would impact both the progression of the disease and the "collateral damage" that would follow. It chose largely to ignore the latter and so we are where we are today.
//Anyway, the time for lockdowns has passed. It's a blunt measure, that should only be implemented when all else fails...//
I quite agree. But the issue is that all else had not failed. Much of it had not even been tried. Fortunately the government simply cannot afford to treat any future outbreaks of Covid (or anything else) in the same way so they will have to think of something else.
Whilst I have only "speed read" it, the report from the first of your links (UK Pandemic Preparedness) was only published some nine months after the pandemic began in the UK so I cannot see how it helps to examine the decision making that went on in March 2020. It does not seem to mention national lockdowns but instead lists some
rather wooly concepts with little detail. The second of your links, incidentally, does not work.
//...then it likely doesn't take a mandate to force *most* people to alter their behaviour, even a little.//
No it doesn't and a few other countries trusted their populations to behave sensibly. The UK government did not and so imposed the most Draconian measures to curb civil liberties this country has ever seen. We will never know whether they were beneficial (in the long term) or not. The indications are that most of them probably were not and it simply isn't good enough to say the government faced an unprecedented problem. It had plenty of information to show how such a pandemic may pan out and how various measures would impact both the progression of the disease and the "collateral damage" that would follow. It chose largely to ignore the latter and so we are where we are today.
//Anyway, the time for lockdowns has passed. It's a blunt measure, that should only be implemented when all else fails...//
I quite agree. But the issue is that all else had not failed. Much of it had not even been tried. Fortunately the government simply cannot afford to treat any future outbreaks of Covid (or anything else) in the same way so they will have to think of something else.
Doubt they will be beneficial. One held a healthy skepticism re politicians beforehand, afterwards just about all trust has been lost as they, the politicians, no matter how they protest otherwise, clearly don't have the interest of the people, or our nation, at heart, but has simy the ego generated desire to control them. That is not the free western culture that I believe in. I'm unsure I should ever encourage any of them again.
// The second of your links, incidentally, does not work. //
Apologies, there should have been a space after the .htm, so it should be
https:/
although that was the third link, but perhaps you missed the one in between because they were so close together. The other "second one" is:
https:/
I'd also like to hear from theprof.
Apologies, there should have been a space after the .htm, so it should be
https:/
although that was the third link, but perhaps you missed the one in between because they were so close together. The other "second one" is:
https:/
I'd also like to hear from theprof.
// Whilst I have only "speed read" it, the report from the first of your links (UK Pandemic Preparedness) was only published some nine months after the pandemic began in the UK so I cannot see how it helps to examine the decision making that went on in March 2020.//
The part which is most relevant, to the point I was making at least, is the part where it talks about how the initial plans, the ones that you insist would have worked, were developed to respond to a flu-like virus. But Covid is not flu (despite many people insisted at the time), either in a literal sense in the manner in which it spread. As a result, it seems pretty unambiguous that (a) the plan failed, (b) because it was targeted at the wrong thing, and (c) the responsible people didn't adapt to this in time (this last is discussed in the links I reproduced above).
In response to a disease, a blanket Lockdown, particularly of the length we saw at the start of 2020, is an admission of failure. It means that other measures either weren't implemented properly or have failed despite best efforts and intentions. In that sense, I think our conclusions are broadly the same: lockdowns cannot be allowed to happen again, and future pandemic responses must be able to adapt more rapidly to the novel diseases that await, be that administratively or otherwise.
Where they differ seems to be the extent to which that was already true this time. It certainly *could* have been avoided: the most relevant lesson is probably from countries like South Korea, or Taiwan, and hopefully their systems will be studied more closely in the UK and other Western countries, but in South Korea's case at least that system had been in place in response to SARS and MERS outbreaks from 2003/2014, so there was evidently time for the UK to pick up on this. But it seems perverse in the extreme to argue that the approach in early March was working, and that in that scenario lockdown was already unnecessary. If anything, the problem was that the reaction was too slow. Not necessarily in terms of going into lockdown already in February, or earlier in March, but certainly in terms of being too keen to avoid "panic" that the response wasn't escalated through more intermediate stages more rapidly. Some, or most, of this is hindsight, though, and I still maintain that the Government's response after that missed opportunity was, broadly, the correct one. It would, in particular, be a shame for one of the few things I give Johnson credit for -- that is, his leadership through that first lockdown (the other one being his response to the War in Ukraine, which was world-leading) -- to be taken away and dismissed as, after all, a panicky reaction that will become a stain on his legacy.
The part which is most relevant, to the point I was making at least, is the part where it talks about how the initial plans, the ones that you insist would have worked, were developed to respond to a flu-like virus. But Covid is not flu (despite many people insisted at the time), either in a literal sense in the manner in which it spread. As a result, it seems pretty unambiguous that (a) the plan failed, (b) because it was targeted at the wrong thing, and (c) the responsible people didn't adapt to this in time (this last is discussed in the links I reproduced above).
In response to a disease, a blanket Lockdown, particularly of the length we saw at the start of 2020, is an admission of failure. It means that other measures either weren't implemented properly or have failed despite best efforts and intentions. In that sense, I think our conclusions are broadly the same: lockdowns cannot be allowed to happen again, and future pandemic responses must be able to adapt more rapidly to the novel diseases that await, be that administratively or otherwise.
Where they differ seems to be the extent to which that was already true this time. It certainly *could* have been avoided: the most relevant lesson is probably from countries like South Korea, or Taiwan, and hopefully their systems will be studied more closely in the UK and other Western countries, but in South Korea's case at least that system had been in place in response to SARS and MERS outbreaks from 2003/2014, so there was evidently time for the UK to pick up on this. But it seems perverse in the extreme to argue that the approach in early March was working, and that in that scenario lockdown was already unnecessary. If anything, the problem was that the reaction was too slow. Not necessarily in terms of going into lockdown already in February, or earlier in March, but certainly in terms of being too keen to avoid "panic" that the response wasn't escalated through more intermediate stages more rapidly. Some, or most, of this is hindsight, though, and I still maintain that the Government's response after that missed opportunity was, broadly, the correct one. It would, in particular, be a shame for one of the few things I give Johnson credit for -- that is, his leadership through that first lockdown (the other one being his response to the War in Ukraine, which was world-leading) -- to be taken away and dismissed as, after all, a panicky reaction that will become a stain on his legacy.
very little in the technical journals
COVID preparedness - my reading is that they tried one and it was a disaster ( collapse of the NHS in a few weeks). - and it was covered up.
Norman Perrow has written about "normal accidents" - complex, tightly coupled and capable of of a catastrophic end.
He says the accidents are normal because they are entirely predictable
tightly coupled is that there is no give or resilience in the system, and has come about in NHS (and the police) as a result of cuts. The first thing you cut is the 'extra' - because no one will notice
COVID preparedness - my reading is that they tried one and it was a disaster ( collapse of the NHS in a few weeks). - and it was covered up.
Norman Perrow has written about "normal accidents" - complex, tightly coupled and capable of of a catastrophic end.
He says the accidents are normal because they are entirely predictable
tightly coupled is that there is no give or resilience in the system, and has come about in NHS (and the police) as a result of cuts. The first thing you cut is the 'extra' - because no one will notice
I thought this was worf more than a speed read
https:/
very heavily depends on Perrow - catastrophic failure was inevitable given the right stresses
https:/
very heavily depends on Perrow - catastrophic failure was inevitable given the right stresses
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