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On This Day In History........1939
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Germany invaded Poland, effectively starting WWII. Though it really became inevitable from around 1933 by the inaction of the west. Britain and France were infected with a Liberal pacifist desire for peace but as we all know if you want peace you must prepare for war. Along with religion Pacifism is another primary cause of war.
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// Britain and France were infected with a Liberal pacifist desire for peace ... //
This feels overly simplistic. France, for example, ought to have some sympathy for bearing the brunt of the Western Front fighting: it was their land that was devastated, many of their young men who died or were injured. According to some sources over 4% of their population died in that war, proportionally twice as many as for Britain; and around 2.5 times that counted as military wounded (again, far more than in the UK).
German losses were proportionally similar, it is true, but if for France victory felt Pyrrhic, then for Germany defeat was bitter, and it was easier to motivate them to get revenge, etc. This, too, is a massive oversimplification in its own way, but it's still relevant to note that France had no desire for another bloody war, whereas Germany had no desire for another bloody defeat, and the two positions are completely different.
But then if France isn't up for the fight, why should Britain be? Just practically, you can't really expect to fight a war on the continent without French backing; to say nothing of the, mistaken in retrospect, decision by the UK and other allies to limit their naval power in various Treaties over the 1920s. But at the time even that wasn't entirely unreasonable, and in any case seems to have been largely driven by the US -- another reason why Britain might have been reluctant to pursue war in the 1930s.
I suppose that point passes the "blame" to the US's own pacifism, or similar, and that's not my intention, especially when I can hardly claim to be an expert on interwar history. But in general we're at the "we don't want war because we have seen how devastating a modern war can be, and besides we're in no fit condition to fight one" point, which at least provides a coherent, though only partial, justification for Chamberlain's approach. I *do* think that towards the end (1938-1939) it was mistaken, but a lot of things went wrong in the build-up to the war and it's simplistic and unfair, in my view, to blame the "infection" of a "liberal pacifist desire for peace" for it. In the long run, that could even have worked, but for a Germany that was wounded, angry, and all too eager to embrace an equally deranged 'saviour'.
This feels overly simplistic. France, for example, ought to have some sympathy for bearing the brunt of the Western Front fighting: it was their land that was devastated, many of their young men who died or were injured. According to some sources over 4% of their population died in that war, proportionally twice as many as for Britain; and around 2.5 times that counted as military wounded (again, far more than in the UK).
German losses were proportionally similar, it is true, but if for France victory felt Pyrrhic, then for Germany defeat was bitter, and it was easier to motivate them to get revenge, etc. This, too, is a massive oversimplification in its own way, but it's still relevant to note that France had no desire for another bloody war, whereas Germany had no desire for another bloody defeat, and the two positions are completely different.
But then if France isn't up for the fight, why should Britain be? Just practically, you can't really expect to fight a war on the continent without French backing; to say nothing of the, mistaken in retrospect, decision by the UK and other allies to limit their naval power in various Treaties over the 1920s. But at the time even that wasn't entirely unreasonable, and in any case seems to have been largely driven by the US -- another reason why Britain might have been reluctant to pursue war in the 1930s.
I suppose that point passes the "blame" to the US's own pacifism, or similar, and that's not my intention, especially when I can hardly claim to be an expert on interwar history. But in general we're at the "we don't want war because we have seen how devastating a modern war can be, and besides we're in no fit condition to fight one" point, which at least provides a coherent, though only partial, justification for Chamberlain's approach. I *do* think that towards the end (1938-1939) it was mistaken, but a lot of things went wrong in the build-up to the war and it's simplistic and unfair, in my view, to blame the "infection" of a "liberal pacifist desire for peace" for it. In the long run, that could even have worked, but for a Germany that was wounded, angry, and all too eager to embrace an equally deranged 'saviour'.
We could have stopped Germany retaking the Rhinelands in 1936. We could also have prevented rearmament with minimal effort and casualties thus preventing the war. I am on Book one if "The second world war" by TGM - it's amazing how we basically sleepwalked into WWII.
"But then if France isn't up for the fight, why should Britain be? " - because once France is conquered we'd be next and very nearly were if not for the RAF and the invention of radar.
"But then if France isn't up for the fight, why should Britain be? " - because once France is conquered we'd be next and very nearly were if not for the RAF and the invention of radar.
The BEF should have learnt a big lesson about protecting France's borders after the 1st W.W.. Fixed fortifications do not work and the French were still reliant on the Maginot line to protect themselves from the Hun in the 2nd lot. As we know, Germany simply outflanked the much boasted fixed fortification and the result was the BEF left high and dry on the beaches of Dunkirk. :-(
13:09, what I mean by that is that pacifists basically tolerate the aggressor until even they cannot stomach it any more then they fight. By then the fight is much worse than it would been had they fought in the first place. Essentially pacifism serves to delay war and incubate it's severity in that delay.
// We could have stopped Germany retaking the Rhinelands in 1936. We could also have prevented rearmament with minimal effort and casualties thus preventing the war. //
It's generally accepted these days that the first sentence is untrue, or at least wildly optimistic. Firstly, it would have been wildly unpopular with the British public; secondly, it would have been logistically challenging, in part for the reasons I hinted above as well as many others I haven't touched on, including financial.
I am not saying that the UK's, or other allies', preparations in what we know see to be the build-up to WWII were correct. But as a matter of pedantry, they surely have to be analysed in terms of what the players knew at the time. And the overarching aspect of it is that the First World War was devastating, and anything at all that sought to avoid that seemed enticing. I don't think that's "pacifism" in its strictest sense.
It's generally accepted these days that the first sentence is untrue, or at least wildly optimistic. Firstly, it would have been wildly unpopular with the British public; secondly, it would have been logistically challenging, in part for the reasons I hinted above as well as many others I haven't touched on, including financial.
I am not saying that the UK's, or other allies', preparations in what we know see to be the build-up to WWII were correct. But as a matter of pedantry, they surely have to be analysed in terms of what the players knew at the time. And the overarching aspect of it is that the First World War was devastating, and anything at all that sought to avoid that seemed enticing. I don't think that's "pacifism" in its strictest sense.
CTG: //But as a matter of pedantry, they surely have to be analysed in terms of what the players knew at the time.//
From "The Second World War", Vol 1, "The Gathering Storm" by Winston S Churchill. Theme of the Volume: "How the English speaking peoples through their unwisdom, carelessness and good nature allowed the wicked to rearm". Enough said!
TGM was there at the time.
From "The Second World War", Vol 1, "The Gathering Storm" by Winston S Churchill. Theme of the Volume: "How the English speaking peoples through their unwisdom, carelessness and good nature allowed the wicked to rearm". Enough said!
TGM was there at the time.
The impression I get from reading about it is that all of the (former) Allies, including the UK, France, US, Czechoslovakia, etc., were all, at the time of the Rhineland at least, waiting for somebody else to act, or waiting for a less technical excuse than a breach of the Versailles Treaty to take action. It's true that in hindsight making only "token" responses was surely a mistake, as it emboldened the German leadership etc. -- in keeping with your recent posts, though frankly even more egregiously, the near-total inaction by the West in response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea is a modern parallel, although one distinction is that the Rhineland was part of Germany, and demilitarisation -- in perpetuity at least -- was surely not reasonable or sustainable. Let the Germans have their sovereignty back; we still maintain restrictions on their navy, and military strength, and that's enough (it was not, but this might have been not unreasonable to hold at the time).
The same was true with the Anschluss: why should anyone block the apparently enthusiastic agreement of the Austrians to unite with Germany? (Again, see Crimea etc.) -- and, even if that were obviously an unfair referendum of support, is that really enough to launch the invasion of a country who has to date not threatened your own soil?
And that last point I think captures the main flaw I think exists in your accusation of pacifism: as long as the UK, or France, were not themselves directly threatened, then refusing to launch an aggressive war is not the same as refusing to prepare for a defensive war. France and Britain *did* engage in preparations for the latter, even if arguably too late, and even though along the way they did sacrifice far too many other nations while waiting to be the victims themselves.
The same was true with the Anschluss: why should anyone block the apparently enthusiastic agreement of the Austrians to unite with Germany? (Again, see Crimea etc.) -- and, even if that were obviously an unfair referendum of support, is that really enough to launch the invasion of a country who has to date not threatened your own soil?
And that last point I think captures the main flaw I think exists in your accusation of pacifism: as long as the UK, or France, were not themselves directly threatened, then refusing to launch an aggressive war is not the same as refusing to prepare for a defensive war. France and Britain *did* engage in preparations for the latter, even if arguably too late, and even though along the way they did sacrifice far too many other nations while waiting to be the victims themselves.
"why should anyone block the apparently enthusiastic agreement of the Austrians to unite with Germany? (Again, see Crimea etc.)"
What that tells is is that we don't learn from history: appease a dictator and you store up trouble for the future.
I don't always agree with Tora but his essential point is valid.
What that tells is is that we don't learn from history: appease a dictator and you store up trouble for the future.
I don't always agree with Tora but his essential point is valid.
The ereason no one acted sufficientlly decisively on Crimea was not because of any perceived enthusiasm by the people - although there was undoubtedly some of course - it was because it was simply to difficult to get every one to agree to do anything more. Everyone was caught out and it was too late.
And I suspect the Anschluss was the same.
And I suspect the Anschluss was the same.
canary: "TTT as usual using insults place of a reasoned answer supported by FACTS. Always a stalwart with this strategy. " - you are trying to derail the thread with irrelevant row locks. You'd have to have a warped view to think that the prelude to WWII is comparable to Blair pre Gulf war. OR you're just being facetious. Either way my post at 09:37 applies.
// What that tells is is that we don't learn from history: appease a dictator and you store up trouble for the future. //
Yes, that much I agree with. But if not appeasing means starting the war you were trying to avoid, then have you necessarily improved the situation? Would an aggressive UK/France operation have been successful? Would it have been *popular* with the public? Would it have even also addressed what was happening with the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan etc., all of whom were also stirring at the time?
The UK, at least, cannot -- either now, or at the time -- unilaterally bring peace by occupying such nations and removing their leadership. All the nations would have to do that together. And, well, the League of Nations was toothless, with neither its own army nor the support of the US.
Yes, that much I agree with. But if not appeasing means starting the war you were trying to avoid, then have you necessarily improved the situation? Would an aggressive UK/France operation have been successful? Would it have been *popular* with the public? Would it have even also addressed what was happening with the Soviet Union, Italy, Japan etc., all of whom were also stirring at the time?
The UK, at least, cannot -- either now, or at the time -- unilaterally bring peace by occupying such nations and removing their leadership. All the nations would have to do that together. And, well, the League of Nations was toothless, with neither its own army nor the support of the US.
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