Why Are They Still Making The 737 Max?

[ToraToraTora]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-49026285
Surely no one will ever get on one again anyway.

[Buenchico]

As soon as they've found a fix for the problem with the MCAS flight control system, I'd be perfectly happy to fly on them.

[ToraToraTora]

braver man than me gungadin!

[Calicogirl]

I'm on a 777 on Tuesday- don't think I've ever seen so many plane crash threads on Answerbank in my life. Cheers lol :)

[TheChair]

The MCAS flight control system exists only because the airframe design is so inherently unstable. Fixing a hardware problem in software is OK for fighter jets (where instability improves manoeuvrability), but in a passenger jet is ridiculous.

[237SJ]

^ The airframe was never unstable. What unstablised it was sticking new heavy engines on it.

[retrocop]

I thought the hardware was always available to customers who were willing to pay extra for it as an option. I thought I had read that Boeing was making it standard now to all customers.

[CrapAtCryptics]

I suggested that they get some competent programmers in and tell them, as part of their contract, that they would be on the first 2 or 3 flights to ensure their work is sound.

[mushroom25]

//unstable // a 737max may be unstable compared to a normal 737, but a max without MCAS would be perfectly flyable, just requiring crews to be trained to handle it. nobody wanted that though due to the additional cost, MCAS is there to make the max feel and fly like an old 737 so reducing crew training needs etc etc

[derek-33]

i would fly on one after its been back in service for a couple of years,

[Gromit]

The 737 had old and inefficient engines and they were losing a lot of customers to the European Airbus.
To design a totally new aircraft from scratch would have taken too long and Boeing could go out of business, so a modification of the existing 737 was the solution.
Because the new engines were taller and bigger, the had to be mounted higher (to give ground clearance). The only way they could mount them higher was to move them more forward.
That change meant that the handling characteristics of the plane changed dramatically and pilots would have had to undergo costly retraining.
To circumvent that problem, they designed new software to help pilots. But the software relied on a sensor which was unreliable, and the software was correcting for a fault problem that did not exist, and was over ruling the human pilots.
A software patch and a redesigned sensor will coorect the problem, but the company and the 737Max reputation might be irreparably damaged.

[derek-33]

also it relied on ONE sensor not two like all the other aircraft this one faltered so no back up, cost cutting at it worst !

[ToraToraTora]

gromit, "But the software relied on a sensor which was unreliable, and the software was correcting for a fault problem that did not exist, and was over ruling the human pilots. " - indeed that's the bit that worries me, humans should always be able to override software. The software may not have been at fault but the sensor was, thus the software was acting on incorrect data. QED it should never be possible for a machine to override a human.

[davebro]

TTT - more aircraft crashes are down to pilot error than mechanical or systems failure.

[237SJ]

They seem to have plenty of orders.

[Hopkirk]

It was worse than that it could override the pilots.

The pilots hadn't been fully told that the MCAS system existed.

[ToraToraTora]

"TTT - more aircraft crashes are down to pilot error than mechanical or systems failure" - perhaps, but this is a clear case of software reacting to faulty sensors and killing people. Software should never override people I work in IT, I know.

[TonyV]

lessons learned. I have some of the original square aluminium cut outs for windows.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/19/newsid_3112000/3112466.stm

[mushroom25]

at time of certification and with agreement of FAA, Boeing did not reference the MCAS in the aircraft's operations manual. According to Boeing, "a pilot should never see the operation of MCAS in normal flying conditions, and it is fundamentally embedded in the handling qualities and not a separate system to be trained on". thus Boeing saw no need to provide data that they considered "too much information"; system activation was expected to be rare, and its operation was expected to go unnoticed by the pilot.

there was a faulty sensor. this would not of itself cause loss of the aircraft; what did that was the crew were totally unprepared for the failure and didn't know how to work around it.

Boeing should have heeded the advice of their test pilot and initiated an aerodynamic fix; or, been totally upfront about the MCAS (but run the risk of not getting MAX and NG versions of the 737 on the same type certificate.

[derek-33]

237SJ
saudi air has cancelled there $5.9 billion order

[DTCwordfan]

A blonde gets on a 737 Max airplane to fly back home

As she enters the plane, she begins jumping up and down, all the way to her seat.

The flight attendant notices this, concerned for the blondes mental state, notifies the captain of her actions.

The captain walks down to the blonde, who’s now bouncing in her seat. He asks the blonde “why did you jump to your seat, and why are you bouncing now?”

The blonde replies “well, isn’t this a Boeing?