Jonathan-Joe indicated this was a philosophy question. I believe this has clearly progressed into the realm of science. Our goal is to prove this with the consciousness survey project at canonizer.com. The theory being developed in the "Representational Qualia Theory" camp (see:
http://canonizer.com/topic.asp/88/6 ) already seems to be indicating there is a real scientific consensus on the answer to this question. As ever more experts contribute to the survey, this theory continues to extend the amount of expert consensus it has compared to any other theory.
It predicts the term 'red' is an ambiguous term. There is 'causal red', as when things like a strawberry reflecting 650 nm light. And as Jake said we call this causal phenomenon "red". This causal property is a property of the initial cause of the perception process and is obviously independent of any experiencer.
However, at the other end of the perception process is something in our brain, that is our knowledge of the strawberry. An ineffable phenomenal property like the taste of salt or phenomenal redness, or a qualia, is predicted by the theory, to be a property of this knowledge in our brain. The predictions includes the very likely possibility of such things as inverted qualia (my red could be phenomenally the same as your green...).
Computers can represent the same information abstractly, and by design it doesn't matter what such abstract knowledge is represented with - only that the particular representation be interpreted correctly. Our phenomenal knowledge, on the other hand, what it is phenomenally like is all important and what 'consciousness' is all about.
With the consciousness survey project we intend to prove, definitively, (or possibly not) that there is already a clear scientific consensu